COMMENTS
THE "NEW ADMINISTRATIVE LAW"-WITH
THE SAME OLD JUDGES IN IT?
PATRICIA M. WALD*

And now, as they say, news from the front. Twelve years of reviewing administrative decisions brings to mind The Witching Hour, the current best seller by Anne Rice.1 In it, a Lucifer-like spirit called Lasher
roams through several generations of a New Orleans family. In each
generation, a female family member, also a witch, acts as the medium for
calling Lasher into being. At various times, depending on the nature of
the witch, his spirit heals and nourishes; at other times it maims and
destroys. Always, however, there is a seductive relationship between the
spirit and the earthbound witch-they entice, thrill, and eventually take
over one another, body and soul. This description is probably as good as
any of what administrators and judges do with statutory spirits: New
relationships form in each generation and the statutory spirit itself takes
on new forms-sometimes for the good, sometimes for the bad. Our
friends in academia are not innocent bystanders. Invariably, they also
join in the seance, successively urging judges to be more adventurous,
skeptical, deferential, or restrained-and now more substantive (in Sunstein's case) and governance-oriented (in Edley's case)-in calling forth
the statutory spirit.
I.

EDLEY'S "NEw ADMINISTRATIVE LAW"

In his Article, Professor Edley prefers to explain our current administrative law through a different, developmental metaphor: a system born
in the New Deal era and now approaching its adolescence. Adopting his
metaphor, sometime during the "bar mitzvah period" of administrative
law, Judge Harold Leventhal spoke of agencies and courts as "collabora* Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit; B.A. Connecticut College, 1948; L.L.B. Yale Law School, 1951.
1. A. RICE, THE WITCHING HOUR (1990).
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tive instrumentalities of justice," 2 and a "partnership in furtherance of
the public interest."'3 We may have come full circle in Professor Edley's
proposed "dialogue" between courts and agencies on the norms of sound
governance. 4 However, relations between agencies and courts have
soured in the intervening two decades. The "adolescent" agencies often
perceive courts as oppressive and outdated patriarchs (or matriarchs, as
the case may be) laying down absolute and even dysfunctional rules that
make the normal operations of the agencies well-nigh impossible. Academics, however, think of courts as parents, too weak and permissive to
insure the healthy development of our precocious ward. Edley urges us
to move away from the interminable wrangling over discretion and the
fine print of statutes, and to move toward a higher concern with sound
governance principles.
Edley tells us that the "third wave post-liberal theories" he espouses
so elegantly will "find resonance with judges if the implications of those
theories are given concrete meaning in the work of the law and the design
of institutions."' 5 Here, I hope to provide some constructive criticism
from the judicial trenches. Like Edley, I also would welcome change in
the direction of sounder governance, but I believe the conceptual roots of
such a change must accommodate judicial realities and constitutional
constraints if it is to happen at all.
A. Discretion: The Acne of Administrative Law
Edley's criticism of the current administrative law scene recognizes
(as it must) that a complicated administrative state such as our own requires a great deal of discretion, liberally spread around. On one hand,
Edley chides the "liberal legal ideology" for too facilely portraying the
role of discretion in government as inherently dangerous, such that
"[t]he consequent threat to personal liberty and the general welfare must
be contained through public law, including administrative law."' 6 On the
other hand, however, Edley also seems to buy into the popular criticism
ofjudicial review as simply transferring discretion from the bureaucrat to
the judge, "hiding it, as it were, beneath black robes and in dusty
2. Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 852 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 403
U.S. 923 (1971).
3. Id. at 851.
4. See Edley, The Governance Crisis, Legal Theory, and PoliticalIdeology, 1991 DUKE L.J.
561, 600-04.
5. Id. at 589.
6. Id. at 566.
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volumes unintelligible to the lay public and media.'' 7 Eventually, Edley
embraces more discretion for both agencies and courts, and trusts that
abuses will be controlled by a kind of family therapy exchange between
the two entities, replacing the inadequate and manipulative sets of "dos
and don'ts" that presently govern the relationship. "Rather than
shrouding judicial discretion in indirection and doctrinal manipulation,
new courts and new judges would undertake this project with a self-conscious sense of their potential contribution to a collective effort to im'8
prove governance."
Edley's diagnosis of the "normative dualities" and the tripartite
"boundary problems" between adjudicatory fairness, science, and politics
(a.k.a. law, expertise, and policy) that plague our adolescent administrative law is creative and instinctively plausible. Edley correctly traces that
model to its ancestral origins in the constitutional separation of executive, legislative, and judicial powers. 9 Nonetheless, for the following reasons, I am not convinced that he has made the case for throwing out the
current system-acne and all-or even demoting it to a subsidiary role as
the framework for judicial review.
First, judges are relatively sophisticated about the artificiality of
compartmentalizing disputes into one paradigm over another. We are
aware that none of the three major governance functions-legislative, executive, and judicial-are exclusively performed by any one branch, and
that these functions are overlapping ones with permeable boundaries,
INS v. Chadha10 notwithstanding. In government, there are few bright
lines, and many shades of grey. I doubt that many of today's judges
"indulge a dream that Congress must make all fundamental policy judgments and that the role of bureaucrats should be confined as nearly as
possible to ministerial implementation.""u Similarly, judges know that
administrative disputes inevitably involve mixes of the three paradigmslaw, expertise, and policy-and that the boundary lines are often fuzzy.
Thus, I am neither ready to plead guilty on behalf of the judiciary to any
significant amount of judicial "paradigm-shopping" to find the right
standard of review, nor about to concede to judicial naivet6 that administrative decisions can easily be categorized into a single paradigm. For
instance, I do not believe that judges generally move faster to intervene in
a case grounded on adjudicatory fairness challenges than in cases
7. Id. at 567. As an aside, I would put my money on the media's capacity to understand
judicial decisions. For instance, the Wall Street Journal'seditorial page takes delight in ferreting out
any conceivable-let alone real-judicial takeover of which its writers disapprove.
8. Id. at 604.
9. See id. at 574.
10. 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (invalidating legislative veto as usurpation of executive function).
11. Edley, supra note 4, at 602.
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brought on other grounds. Vermont Yankee 12 put a stop to judicial innovation in the procedural arena; an occasional case involving a dispute
over the need for notice and comment is basically all the administrative
procedure we deal with now. On the whole, courts have been quite hospitable to the agency's need for flexibility in wielding its discretion. 13 In
sum, I am not sure that the case for excessive judicial formalism and
manipulation in the trichotomy-based review has yet been made.
Second, I believe the distinction between agencies (or Congress) as
the expert policymakers, and the courts as the Moses-like parent figures
confined to saying mostly "you can't do this or that, but in between, lead
your own life-we don't want to be your pals or join in your games," is
the correct primary focus for judicial review. Of course, different judges
(and sometimes even the same judge in different cases) may on occasion
exploit the "normative dualities" of the distinctions between law, expertise, and policy, stressing plain textual meaning (even after fifty years of a
different interpretation), or the need for reasoned elaboration, or political
accountability, or the need for consistency in administrative interpretation as necessary to meet the desired result. And, indeed, some cases
involve facts so complex, or legal doctrines so vague and inherently judgmental (a "reasoned judgment" could go either way) that judges are
driven to a synergistic bottom line. In such cases, even the most conscientious judge who reads the record and briefs, and listens to the arguments of counsel, often leaves the bench with a gut feeling that one side is
right. However, the same judge (unless of course she has come from
academia) may not be able to present an elaborate organization of her
reasoning at conference-the subconscious has knit a multitude of concerns into a tapestry in which the individual skeins are not easily pulled
apart.
Despite all this, the nature ofjudging requires a bona fide attempt at
a reasoned rationale as a critical part of the integrity of both the agency
and court decisionmaking processes, even though "dualities" of "trichotomies," and more, enter into the process, however hard theorists try to
define or confine it. Thus, although judges recognize the duality and the
boundary problems that Edley cites, I believe we already deal with them
as conscientiously as we can. Of course, we have not yet systematically
directed our efforts toward Edley's prescription of "evolv[ing] a norma12. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435
U.S. 519 (1978) (holding that courts may not require agencies making rules to adopt and follow
procedures not specifically required by Congress).
13. See Schuck & Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An EmpiricalStudy of FederalAdministrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 984, 1011 ("The courts have practically gone out of the business of imposing new procedural requirements on agencies.").
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tive framework for sound agency governance." 14 Many judges resist being "drawn into that challenge, with all the attendant risks and potential
benefits." 15 Maybe like Hamlet, we would simply "rather bear those ills
we have / Than fly to others that we know not of,"1 6 but I think our
doubts go deeper.
I am not sure we can or should escape the separation of powers
focus of judicial review. That focus is still needed for our legitimacy and
is best attuned to our competency. Administrative agencies are hybrid
creatures juxtaposed on the three constitutionally defined branches.
Although we need them, we also need some rules to prevent these sometimes unruly, rebellious adolescents from taking over the entire
household.
As Edley points out, administrative agencies have grown up in an
era of divided government: Republicans in the Presidency and in control
of the agencies, Democrats in control of Congress. The agencies typically want to do things they think need doing, in accordance with the
philosophical bent of the current administration. Although they may
chafe at the bridle of old statutes, agencies do not always have the power
to get objectionable statutory language repealed or amended within a reasonable time frame. In frustration, the agency often "goes for it" anyway, by new interpretations of the old law. Of course, this approach puts
the courts in the middle. The "law of the referee" is invoked to call the
shot-up or down, and of course to give reasons. Although one may
disagree with some of our calls, the essence of the judicial function and
its structural role in these disputes is still, I believe, sound and necessary.
At the behest of aggrieved parties, the courts act as a brake on the political branch that tries to run off with the powers of another. In administrative law, of course, the aggrieved party typically charges that the
executive has exceeded the powers delegated by Congress. This allegation recurs hundreds of times every term in our court. Short of constitutional overhaul, how will reconceptualizing administrative law,
rethinking judicial review, or even revising our "ideology," change that
essential role of the judiciary or the inevitable focus it puts on separation
of powers concerns?
Our Constitution operates on a notion of limited government, and
administrative agencies wield vast powers over everyday human affairs.
Assuming we do not want their actions to be totally discretionary, how
should they be limited? Although internal executive monitoring has its
role, not everyone-including Congress-would be content to let the Of14. Edley, supra note 4, at 603.
15. Id.
16. W. SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 3, sc. 1, lines 81-82 (T. Spencer ed. 1980).
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fice of Management and Budget (OMB) have the final word. Its proximity, both geographically and politically, to the Oval Office does not assure
neutrality in isolating itself from the excesses or conflicts of power. 17 Of
course, Congress can hold oversight hearings, and even occasionally
deny appropriations for a specific purpose, but that hammer-and-chisel
approach must be and is used selectively, albeit often on political
grounds. Thus, it is not clear what would replace the "containment"
potential of judicial review in the new administrative law.
Edley accepts the relevancy of separation of powers to sound governance review, but would mute its dominant role. 18 I am not so sanguine that this shift in institutional role can or should occur. After all,
the courts are a receptor branch, and unhappy litigants push our judicial
buttons. If parties raise challenges of lack of statutory authority for an
agency's action, courts must react. If Edley's broader aspirations for
sound governance, i.e., "growth and investment stimulated through regulation; equality (not mere promises of opportunity); education and children; environmentalism; activist government; and effectiveness and
accountability of large organizations, public and private"' 19 actually came
to fruition, I believe the need for separation of powers review by courts
would be greater, not less. The more social and economic power we give
government agencies, the more essential judicial review becomes as a
safety valve to insure that they do not abuse it.
The separation of powers doctrine itself stems from a fear of concentration of power, and envisions a watchdog stance among the branches.
However, Edley's approach adopts a "let us reason together" thesis, a
much more optimistic tack than the Framers took. Even if time proves
Edley right, agencies will still need watching. Although most judges do
not conceive of executive discretion as dangerous 20 -indeed, in the D.C.
Circuit, we uphold agency action in over sixty percent of our cases 2 1 many also feel that the evaluation of agency action under authorizing
statutes or even the broadly worded mandates of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) 22 is still vitally necessary to an accountable govern17. See, eg., Lewis, Regulatory Review Office in Dispute, N.Y. Times, May 5, 1990, § 1, at 10,
col. 4 (OMBhas been "main focus of an ideological battle over reducing the amount of Government
regulation").
18. See Edley, supra note 4, at 597.
19. Id. at 598.
20. See, e.g., Williams, The Roots of Deference (Book Review), 100 YALE L.J. 1103 (1991)
(reviewing C. EDLEY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: RETHINKING JUDICIAL CONTROL OF BUREAUCRACY (1990)) (criticizing Edley's enthusiasm for judicial activism as too extreme).
21. Schuck & Elliott, supra note 13, at 1042.
22. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706, 1305, 3105, 3344, 5372 (1988).
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ment and, in some cases, to individual liberties. 23 The real question is:
Can or should we be doing more?
B. JudicialPolitics
Before turning to the new and enlarged role Edley envisions for
courts, let me briefly allude to one of Edley's most intriguing suggestions.
Edley calls for an express recognition of "the role of partisan ideology or
political preferences in agency decisionmaking" in the context of judicial
review. 24 Edley correctly finds that the content of administrative decisions is often "deeply and thoroughly political. '25 Everyone who has
done a stint in the federal executive branch (including many currently on
the bench) has war stories of the White House or OMB "knocking
agency heads together" in an attempt to make results come out in a politically acceptable way. The question of course is what, if anything, the
courts can or should do about this phenomenon. Even if, as Edley hypothesizes, an agency were to be utterly candid about revising regulations
to better fit the President's regulatory philosophy, 26 our basic judicial
function would remain the same. We would still need to determine if the
challenged regulation was authorized by the statute and whether it made
sense under the APA, in light of the facts or expert opinions considered
by the agency. Even if agencies appear to be hunting and scratching for
objective justifications to support a highly desirable political result,2 7 the
court's basic mission remains, even if it feels compelled to treat the
agency's asserted justifications as its real reasons, although the Beltway
cognoscenti know differently.
Edley claims that there are three benefits from increased agency and
judicial candor about the role of politics in administrative law: (1) "the
agency will feel less pressure to contrive answers within the science paradigm" 28 so as to bring its decisions within the bounds of its discretion
under the statute; (2) "the agency focuses the public and reviewing court
23. It is interesting to observe that the newly emerging democracies in Eastern Europe and the
Baltics are most avidly interested in the American experience with review of executive and legislative
action by an independent judiciary as an antidote to decades of citizen impotence in the face of
omnipotent bureaucracies. See, eg., Skapska, The Rule of Law from the East Central European
Perspective, 15 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 699, 700 (1990) (Polish reformists stress "the independence of
the courts of law and their rights to control all other authorities created in order to protect the legal
order and the public interest."). The courts' control of administrative discretion is apparently academically avant garde rather than passi in Eastern Europe.
24. Edley, supra note 4, at 576.
25. Id. at 562 (quoting R. DWORKIN, A MATrER OF PRINCIPLE 146 (1985)).
26. See id. at 578.
27. See id.
28. Id. at 577.
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on whether additional science (i.e., evidence) should be required"; 2 9 and
(3) "the agency is signalling to the public and Congress that the decision
... reflects the workings of the electoral process."' 30 As to the first and
second benefits, agencies should be constrained by their statutory authority, and it is the courts' job to see that they are. And although the third
benefit may have some merit, Congress is directly elected by the people,
whereas agency heads partake only indirectly in the President's electoral
mandate. Thus, when Congress passes a law, that action has just as
much (if not a greater) majoritarian imprint as an agency decision justified in whole or in part by the President's political preferences. If an
agency decision is arguably outside the intent of Congress, it signals no
victory for majority rule even if it is consistent with the President's
policies.
Actually, the Justices of the Supreme Court have recently expressed
their recognition of politics as a legitimate component of administrative
action. In State Farm,3 1 the Reagan Department of Transportation
sought to revoke a mandatory rule on automobile airbag and passenger
restraints. On review, the Supreme Court reversed the agency on standard administrative law "hard-look" grounds. 32 Although it recited that
an "agency must be given ample latitude to 'adapt their rules and policies
to the demands of changing circumstances,' 33 the Court also insisted
that "the agency must examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action including a 'rational connection between
the facts found and the choice made.' -34 The Court overturned the rule
revocation as unjustified, based on the evidence before the agency.
It was Justice Rehnquist's separate opinion, however, that explicitly
posed the weighty "P" issue:
The agency's changed view of the standard seems to be related to the
election of a new President of a different political party. It is readily
apparent that the responsible members of one administration may consider public resistance and uncertainties to be more important than do
their counterparts in a previous administration. A change in administration brought about by the people casting their votes is a perfectly
reasonable basis for an executive agency's reappraisal of the costs and
benefits of its programs and regulations. As long as the agency remains within the bounds established by Congress, it is entitled to assess
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id.
Id.
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
Id. at 41, 57.
Id. at 42 (quoting Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 784 (1968)).
Id. at 43 (quoting Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)).
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administrative records35and evaluate priorities in light of the philosophy

of the administration.

It may surprise some to hear that I think now-Chief Justice Rehnquist was both right in principle and accurate as to the current practice.
Political ideology and presidential policies are thumbs on the scales when
agencies balance their various obligations and considerations under a
statute or decide how to evaluate certain kinds of factual or expert evidence in a record. Ideology can, and frequently does, provide a lens
through which the agency views the evidence, and even reinterprets
broadly worded statutory standards like "best interests of the public."
Judges intuit this and generally provide ample elbow room to the passing
parade of new agency heads in interpreting their old statutory mandates.
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC), for instance, was able
to accomplish a communications deregulation revolution in radio and
television licensing without running afoul of the courts, going to Congress for new authority, or even talking about politics. 36 But as Justice
Rehnquist points out, political ideology cannot carry the agency outside
of statutory commands or prohibitions, and presumably not outside the
38
APA's "substantial evidence" 3 7 or "arbitrary and capricious"
standards.
So what would more agency and judicial candor about politics
achieve? One might envision a diminished judicial review, limited to determining whether an agency's change in direction ran clearly contrary
to statutory directives. This would limit review to a Chevron 39 inquiry
that asks only if Congress had specifically prohibited the agency action.
This move, however, would clearly require a change in the APA. Beyond that, a court could dispense with any arbitrariness/rationality inquiry on the assumption that politics has its own raison d'etre. Of
course, constitutional sine qua nons like procedural due process or equal
protection would still have to be honored. I doubt, however, that Edley's
plea is headed in that direction. Edley may merely be requesting more
explicit acknowledgment of what the courts are already doing.4° He
says:
35. Id. at 59 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
36. See, eg., Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 707 F.2d 1413
(D.C. Cir. 1983) (upholding FCC decision to eliminate or modify existing regulations and to adopt
new rules and policies as a product of informed rulemaking procedures conducted pursuant to the
APA).

37. 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (1988).
38. Id. § 706(2)(A).
39. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865-86
(1984).
40. For another example of Supreme Court recognition of the legitimacy of political considerations, see Justice Stevens's opinion in Chevron itself:
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My own view is that when the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), the National Highway Transportation Safety Administration (NHTSA), EPA, OSHA, and other agencies discharge
mandates of great political moment, governance would profit from
some frank effort to explain the interrelationship of science, politics,
and rule of law methods....
...
Reviewing courts should credit politics as an appropriate
element of decisonmaking,
subject to reasonable tests of conflict with
41
science and law.
But how are courts supposed to react to this statement? Should we
merely take judicial notice of the articulated political component of a
decision and apply our standard tests to the rest of the decision to see if it
passes muster?42 Or should courts give special deference when the decision is avowedly at least partially political? Edley's warning that an
overruling of a political decision would be perceived as a "political" act
highlights the downside of letting it all hang out. 43 I fear that more explicit judicial candor about the role of politics in decisionmaking, particularly by reviewing the political aspects of agency decisions, would
inevitably bring politics into the courthouse as well. Perhaps political
considerations already lurk in the shadows of judicial review, but do we
really want to bring it into the sunlight? The judiciary still operates on
the public perception that courts perform some type of neutral umpire
function in a nonpolitical way. If we dive into the political surf neck
deep, will we not pay the price of increased cynicism about our role in
other areas of the law where our credibility is even more essential to our
function?
Edley makes one telling point that does hit home. In an era of divided government, agency deference is not equivalent to political neutrality. In practice, too much deference to an agency can amount to a
judicial alliance with the executive against the legislature. Edley recognizes that the legislature deserves the system of checks and balances. 44 I
suppose that everything in law, especially administrative law, partakes

[Ain agency to which Congress has delegated

policymaking responsibilities may, within the
limits of that delegation, properly rely upon the incumbent administration's views of wise
policy to inform its judgments. While agencies are not directly accountable to the people,
the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the Government to make such policy choices-resolving the competing interests which Congress itself
either inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved by the agency
charged with the administration of the statute in light of everyday realities.

Id.
41. Edley, supra note 4, at 576, 578.
42. This would not be unlike excusing bar applicants from the essay part of the bar exam if they
score high enough on the multistate portion!
43. See Edley, supra note 4, at 577.
44. See id. at 599-600.
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somewhat of politics, but there are gradations. In the end, I think judges
must be cautious about explicitly inviting politics into the realm of their
review. Politics as well as discretion must operate within legal and constitutional constraints; my view is that it already has plenty of room to do
SO.
C. The Dialogue
Edley's project theorizes a larger role for courts than merely keeping
agencies statutorily or even politically honest. The core of his new administrative law would be:
an ongoing exchange with the political branches about norms of sound
governance.... [A] process of subconstitutional, common law elaboration of substantive and procedural matters ranging from cost-benefit
methodology, to the paper hearing requirements in informal rulemaking, to presumptions about the direction of congressional policies
trenching on such fundamental
social concerns as federalism and in45
come redistribution.
I am intrigued but perplexed about several aspects of the "dialogue." Who authorizes it? Congress, of course, has been vested by the
Constitution with the authority to define the jurisdiction of courts and
the scope of judicial review.4 6 So presumably Congress must be a willing
partner in any revamping of the federal courts' role in the new governance. Fidelity to an ephemeral congressional intent has been much criticized as an exclusive or even primary goal of judicial review,47 but
apparently Congress continues to see the courts as their post-enactment
defender. It remains unclear how readily Congress would authorize a
radical change in that role.
Redefining our own role would be more difficult. Edley cites examples in our present jurisprudence where courts engage in dialogue with
agencies, i.e., public interest institutional reform, antitrust decrees, and
corporate bankruptcies. 48 Although federal judges have indeed worked
with schools, prisons, and asylum officials over many years to insure constitutional rights, the dialogue in these cases occurs in the remedy
phase-after there has been an initial finding or concession of constitutional or statutory violations. If Edley's prescription for judicial guidelines, presumptions, and temporary stays of mandates to allow agency
counterproposals are all geared to post-violation administrative law remedies, they may indeed have some analogies in other parts of our juris45. Id. at 601.
46. See U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2, ci. 2.
47. See C. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY
STATE 127-37 (1990).
48. See Edley, supra note 4, at 601.
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prudence. But if his conception of the dialogue would actively engage us
in agency governance review before deciding if an agency has erred, I

know of no current practices that resemble his proposal. The authority
for any such departure from our present practice, if indeed it is constitu-

tionally permissible, must surely come from Congress, especially after
Vermont Yankee, 49 Chevron, 50 and Pension Benefit Guarantee Corp. v.
LTV Corp.5 1 (which Edley suggests would disappear into the mist5 2).

Permitting a court to review and presumably remand if it disagrees with
agency use of resources, public participation, experts, or cost-benefit
analyses in their decisions 53 would amount to an awesome extension of
judicial power. Assuming it would be constitutional, this step would
54
surely require approval by Congress before implementation.
Finally, what do judges like myself really have to contribute to the

governance dialogue? Edley is more optimistic than I am after twelve
years on the D.C. Circuit. He believes that "administrative lawyers, and
especially judges, ... are steeped in the ways of public administration,"

and a "program of study and focus recommended by Sunstein would
make us more so."

5

However, asking judges to familiarize themselves

enough with the policies and operations of the dozens of agencies that
49. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435
U.S. 519 (1978).
50. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865-86
(1984).
51. 110 S.Ct. 2668 (1990).
52. See Edley, supra note 4, at 601.
53. Edley correctly points out that courts now frequently remand for a more adequate explanation when they find it impossible to decide whether the agency's decision has been rational and taken
into account all relevant considerations. See, eg., Tennessee Gas & Pipeline Co. v. Federal Energy
Regulatory Comm'n, 926 F.2d 1206 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (remanding for more adequate explanation
concerning selection of rate and return in ratemaking proceeding). This concept, however, is not
infinitely expandable to include all the components of decisionmaking on which the court and
agency heads might disagree.
54. In fairness, the new judicial role is only one part of Edley's larger cosmos for administrative
law, which involves integrating a view of the world and an all-embracing political ideology with the
way we govern. The bigger regulatory picture is also the backdrop for Sunstein's value-laden, contestable canons. In view of this, the source of the global vision becomes all the more important.
In a political democracy, one might expect that global view to come from Congress and the
President, preferably as a unit. But I understand that the vision of the new administrative law is one
that should not change with every election, veering from New Deal to Reaganomics, but must exist
on some higher plane, apart from these political shifts. In my experience, however, power influences
ideology just as much as ideology influences the exercise of power. Thus, the anti-government,
quasi-populist philosophy attributed to Reaganism gave way in some administrative decisions to an
aggressive assertion of executive power and a decided tilt against broadened public participation.
Indeed, even articulate proponents ofjudicial restraint often took on a decidedly activist stance when
it came to announcing revisionary doctrines on standing, political question, ripeness, zone of interest,
federalism, and separation of powers. The dialogue that Edley envisions would seem to require a
good deal more consensus on the global vision among the participants than presently exists.
55. Edley, supra note 4, at 596.
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appear in hundreds of cases a year, and whose functions vary from labor
to shipping to nuclear energy to gas regulation, so that we can participate
as equals in their good governance, is asking a great deal. Edley suggests
that specialized courts, masters, and super-agency review boards might
supplant, or at least supplement, article III judges in this regard.5 6 We
are all familiar with the separate debate about the legitimacy of those
devices,5 7 but even if their usefulness as adjuncts is conceded, the reason
for the dialogue never becomes quite clear. Why should the courts become "an alternative forum in which to appeal the alleged missteps of the
other two branches?" 5 8 Our intent might be pure-Edley says legitimacy
would stem from our efforts to promote good governance 59-but our
abilities would be highly suspect. Would we not become super-agencies
reviewing the same groundwork as the agencies themselves, and if so,
why? Why should the effort not begin with getting better administrators
rather than redirecting judges' energies down this radical path?6° In
Edley's world, judges would presumably continue to act out their traditional roles in other areas of the law. Is it really cost efficient to turn
courts into super-administrators in this area only?
Edley twits critics of the current administrative law that they must
do more than "wage a guerrilla war in dissenting opinions and law reviews"; to be effective "those who would urge a redirection of doctrine
must make intellectual alliance with those who are struggling to create a
coherent loyal opposition in the realms of ideology and theory." 61 I applaud his gargantuan efforts to articulate tenets of that new ideology, but
I think we may need another round of dialogue about the judicial role in
it.
II.

SUNSTEIN'S "ADMINISTRATIVE SUBSTANCE"

Professor Sunstein calls upon legislators, administrators, and judges
to become more intimately acquainted with the substantive purposes of
regulatory programs, the pathologies to which the programs are subject,
the forces that bring these pathologies into being, and the consequences
56. See id. at 604.
57. See, e.g.. McCree, BureaucraticJustice: An Early Warning, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 777 (1981)
(describing growth in judicial staff and accompanying danger of dilution of individual judge's responsibility for decisionmaking); Resnik, ManagerialJudges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982) (tracing
historical development of the role of federal judges and the challenges they face with increased
workloads).
58. Edley, supra note 4, at 604.
59. See id
60. See Williams, supra note 20, at 1109.
61. Edley, supra note 4, at 606.
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of regulation for the real world. 62 That is good advice for legislators and
administrators, but as to judges, I am not so sure. Although Sunstein
states that his emphasis on substantive principles of regulation is aimed
primarily at legislators and administrators, he also asserts: "[I]t would
be surprising if an understanding of regulatory goals and performance
did not ultimately affect the practice of judicial review."' 63 Moreover,
Sunstein devotes more than half of his recent book to a new mode of
statutory construction that considers the substantive content of
regulation."4
I agree with many of Sunstein's conclusions about the necessity of
regulation and its success in some areas, and also about the causes of its
failure in others. I also emphatically subscribe to the value of empirical
research in determining how administrative and judicial decisions affect
doings in the real world. I hope law professors do this type of research
more and more. However, I remain somewhat skeptical that there are
many regulatory lessons-on which consensus can be found-that are
distillable into canons that judges may then use to interpret a broad
range of different statutes to achieve the kind of improvements that Sunstein anticipates.
A.

What Are the Lessons?

Initially, I have doubts about the available data on which to base
conclusions about regulatory failure and its causes. Sunstein's examples
are interesting, often plausible, but occasionally a bit conclusory or reflective of a particular point of view. For instance, it is now fashionable
to applaud incentive schemes, such as emissions trading, as a clearly superior alternative to the command-and-control strategies adopted in regulatory legislation a decade ago. But do we yet have the whole story?
Can we be sufficiently certain that such market-based strategies will be so
successful five or ten years from now that we want to incorporate that
preference into a new judicial canon to construe regulatory statutes or to
decide if regulatory decisions are arbitrary or capricious?
For instance, Sunstein suggests that a good "first step" for administrators, and presumably judges, would be:
[T]o adopt a strong presumption in favor of flexible, market-oriented,
incentive-based regulatory strategies....
Incentive-based systems should focus on ends, defined in terms of
the number of lives saved or the amount of pollution reduced, rather
62. See Sunstein, Administrative Substance, 1991 DuKE L.J. 607.
63. Id. at 608.
64. See C. SUNSTEIN, supra note 47, at 111-233.
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than on the means of achieving those ends. Means
(and technologies)
65
are best left to the market, not to bureaucrats.
66
Emission trading programs, we are told, hold enormous promise.
Companies can buy and sell permits to pollute: "In one bold stroke, a
system of tradeable permits would create market-based disincentives to
pollute and market-based incentives for pollution control. ' 67 In this instance, Sunstein cites the work of Professors Ackerman and Stewart
(people I respect) in support of his proposition. 68 But as to differing
points of view, we are told that "most of the criticisms are unpersuasive
or ill-informed. ' 69 We are also provided with the "right" approach to
regulating pesticides, international pollution, waste disposal, automobile
pollution, and workplace safety. 70 In many cases, Sunstein's proposals
sound logical and one cannot reasonably expect a law professor, even one
as gifted as Sunstein, to present the authoritative case for dozens of regulatory strategies in an Article of this kind. But, as a judge, how do I
know whether any one book or article is close enough to the final word to
use as a "norm" to decide the legality of executive regulatory actions, or
to interpret the ambiguous words of the legislature?
Sunstein's basic approach to regulatory lessons is acknowledgedly
an optimistic one: "To be sure, there have been failures, some of them
extremely serious. But the failures come in identifiable patterns, and
they can be avoided in the future. 7 1 He may be right, but certainly one
must accept his evaluation of which regulatory attempts have failed and
why, as well as his curative solutions, before one can proceed to the next
step of translating the lessons into canons or norms for judges to apply
on administrative review. I question whether enough of the returns are
in yet to make that giant step.
In his book, Sunstein admits that many of his corrective canons are
"contestable" and "value laden"; he is to be commended for his candor. 72 Although I would guess that his and my values are not that far
65. Sunstein, supra note 62, at 633 (footnote omitted); see also C. SUNSTEIN, supra note 47, at

109.
66. See Sunstein, supra note 62, at 634.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 635 (citing Ackerman & Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law: The Democratic
Casefor Market Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 171 (1988)).
69. Id. at 636. However, Sunstein does cite to a few equally impressive authorities who he says
set forth "the difficulties of emissions trading." Id. at 636 n.115 (citing S.BREYER, REGULATION
AND ITS REFORM (1982) (setting forth the problems with alternatives to classical regulation
schemes); S. KELMAN, WHAT PRICE INCENTIVES? (1981) (a critique of economic approaches to
environmental regulation)).
70. See id. at 634-42.
71. Id. at 610.
72. Specifically, he states:
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apart, it makes me uneasy to assume tenets of regulatory truth from a
few case studies or analyses, however thoughtful or respected their authors. In my twelve years on the D.C. Circuit, I have reviewed hundreds

of administrative actions by the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA), the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), the Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS), the Federal Communication Com-

mission (FCC), the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), and other
agencies. Although I hold suspicions or impressions about who is on top
or at the bottom of the regulatory honor roll, I do not feel at all sanguine
about concluding that OSHA has regulated toxic substances too strictly
in some cases and too leniently in others, or that EPA has failed or suc73
ceeded as an air, water, or hazardous waste regulator.
Perhaps I belabor the point, but if and when judges are asked to

infuse regulatory lessons into our interpretations of statutory language or
into our judgments about the reasonableness of agency decisions, we will
need more consensus and less contestability than provided by Sunstein's
examples. Valuable scholarship about how regulation fails or succeeds
The challenge is to identify norms on which people might be persuaded to agree. That task
will be highly value-laden. It is impossible to select interpretive norms without making
some assessment of their role in improving or impairing the operation of statutory law....
It follows that the interpretive norms will be defensible only to the extent that good substantive and institutional arguments can be advanced on their behalf.
C. SUNSTEIN, supra note 47, at 158.
73. Similarly, I do not think it so clear cut that the Sherman Act antitrust law must be "read
...as an effort to promote economic welfare (rather than, for example, to promote small business as
such)." Id at 176. In fact, a few years ago I wrote a separate concurrence to an opinion by Judge
Bork suggesting that there were other goals to antitrust law of which judges should take cognizance.
See Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 230-31 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
(Wald, J., concurring) (noting that the objectives of antitrust law include not only promoting economic efficiency, but also enhancing individual and business freedom and allaying political fears),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1033 (1987). However, Sunstein tells me that "[ain interpretive principle
[promoting economic welfare] is the only administratable standard, and such a principle conforms
best to contemporary understandings about the nature of a well-functioning antitrust law." C. SUNSTEIN, supra note 47, at 176. Incidentally, the documentation for that statement is two works by
Robert Bork and Richard Posner, formidable authorities to be sure, but not necessarily conclusive.
Compare R. BORK, THE ANTrrRusr PARADOX (1978) (only goal of antitrust law is to increase
economic efficiency) and R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (1976) (efficiency not only an important goal of antitrust law, it is the only goal) with Pitofsky, The Political
Content ofAntitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 1051 (1979) (antitrust laws promote political values, including fear of excessive concentration of economic power and a desire to enhance individual and
business freedom); Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Originaland Primary Concern of Antitrust: The
Efficiency InterpretationChallenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 68 (1982) ("Congress passed the antitrust
laws to further economic objectives, but primarily objectives of a distributive rather than of an efficiency nature"); and Schwartz, "'ustice"and OtherNon-Economic Goals ofAntitrust, 127 U. PA. L.
Rav. 1076, 1076 (1979) ("putative economic gains should not be the exclusive or decisive factor in
resolving antitrust controversies"). See generally Symposium: The Goals ofAntitrust: A Dialogue on
Policy, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 363 (1965) (various authors debate the means and ends of U.S. antitrust
law).

Vol. 1991:647]

THE "NEW ADMINISTRATIVE LAW"

will probably emerge only slowly and spasmodically, but scholars must
produce more before judges' "comfort level" will reach the point of inferring-or letting someone else infer for them-generalized regulatory
principles to guide statutory interpretation or judgments about the reasonableness of agency actions. 74
B.

The Nexus Between the Regulatory Lessons and the Regulatory
Principles

Even assuming consensus on regulatory pathologies and their
causes, converting those failures into judicial principles that would help
prevent future failures is a daunting task. Indeed, although Sunstein has
made a remarkably creative start, most of his canons are understandably
general and abstract. The nexus between the "lessons" from regulatory
failures and the canons designed to avoid their repetition is not always
clear. For instance, Sunstein asserts that experience shows that most
command-and-control regulatory strategies are wrong; that concentrating on regulating new technology is counterproductive because it encourages keeping old, often worse, technology in place; that regulation should
generally balance costs and benefits; and that most regulatory failures are
due to (1) failure to coordinate different rules for differently situated regulates; (2) capture of the regulators by the regulated; (3) changes in circumstances after the adoption of regulation; (4) Congress's unwillingness
to make complex tradeoffs among social goals; and (5) unanticipated systemic consequences that create disincentives for the players to perform as
regulators intend. 75 At first glance, only a few of these lessons-perhaps
changes in circumstance, but certainly not unintended consequencesare potentially translatable into any judicially usable principles. Unfortunately, any across-the-board principles that can be profitably applied to
the construction of a broad range of regulatory statutes require a level of
generality that does not make for "smart" weapons, i.e., ones likely to hit
the target. This is true for Sunstein's regulatory principles for judicial
use, which include promoting high-level accountability for important decisions, guarding against subversion of statutory goals because of
problems of collective action by beneficiaries, favoring narrow construc74. Sunstein pointed out in informal conversation at the Duke Law Journal Administrative
Law Symposium that judges now often refer to and discuss regulatory norms or principles much like
those he proposes in their opinions as part of "reasoned decisionmaking." I am sure he is right. In
my view, however, the critical difference is that those discussions and references explain judicial
conclusions in particular cases but do not rise to the formal level of precedential canons that judges
must accept or reject as part of their reasoning in future cases. The difference, although perhaps
narrow in concept, is vitally important in practice, especially if (as in my court) judges publish
approximately 300 administrative opinions every year.
75. See Sunstein, supra note 62, at 631-34.
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tion of procedural qualifications of substantive rights, and favoring coordination and consistency and disfavoring irrationality, injustice, and
obsolescence. 76 Unfortunately, these principles require judges to make
many preliminary judgments about the case before deciding if the canons
apply at all.
More specifically, Sunstein says that some of his judicial canons, including those favoring cost-benefit proportionality and de minimis exceptions, apply only to "market failure statutes and statutes responding to
short-term public outcry." 77 However, Sunstein also supports a broad
construction of statutes to protect "traditionally disadvantaged groups
and noncommodity values."7 8 Then Sunstein prescribes a narrow construction of statutes "embodying interest-group transfers." 79 The correct
application of Sunstein's canons assumes that statutory language can be
easily categorized. Nevertheless, I believe that this threshold categoriza80
tion requires a good bit of judicial judgment.
The problem I raise, endemic to all canons, is whether the necessarily abstract level of canons overwhelms their utility as accurate guides to
correct outcomes. When reformers design canons to prevent regulatory
failures, the criticism is even more telling because of the multitude of
unique factors that cause major regulatory failures. Although administrators, who are intimately familiar with all the details and background
of a proposed regulatory action, might usefully apply Sunstein's principles as a checklist to ensure that regulatory actions would arguably fit
within the boundaries they propose, it is an altogether different (and I
think more problematic) exercise for a judge to apply those principles to
a record in deciding whether the administrator evaluated the issues
correctly.
In sum, an expanded canonical jurisprudence raises questions about
the extent of knowledge and consensus on the sources of regulatory pa76. See C. SUNSTmIN,supra note 47, at 237-38.
77. Id at 237.
78. Id. at 238.
79. Id.
80. Indeed, the initial task of deciding which canons are relevant would require more information than judges usually receive under current practices. Judges would need to discern why a particular statute was enacted, which groups exerted pressure for or against the statute, and the real-world
consequences of the policies under challenge. Where would judges get the information necessary to
make these determinations? Are we to scan the court librarian's index for new studies; or should we
rely on the parties' briefs (assuming counsel would start arguing such points if canonical jurisprudence became ensconced, and realizing that such information would always be presented through
the adversaries' lenses). Worst of all worlds, but perhaps most likely, judges might get their information about statutory background and consequences from potentially conflicting sources. One judge
might rely upon American Enterprise Institute studies, others might accept only Brookings, and still
others might consult the Cato Institute. Different sources do not necessarily convey the same
messages.
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thology, the general principles we can extract from such knowledge, and
the assurance with which we can apply those principles to new and infinitely varying regulatory scenarios.
C.

"Canons to the Right of Us, Canons to the Left of Us"--Dilemmas
of Choice

Some of Sunstein's canons appeal to me; others do not. Some have
been with us a long time. 81 Judges tend to use the familiar canons like
SCUD missiles and Patriot interceptors leveled against each other. Recognizing the propensity of canonical jurisprudence to invite canonical
82
wars, Sunstein helpfully provides us with a hierarchy among canons.
Even so, I doubt that the twelve judges on my court would agree on the
validity of the several dozen canons, let alone on their ranking. This
raises the important question of from where consensus for canons should
come: counsel, enterprising judges, courts of appeal, the Supreme Court,
or the Congress. Perhaps even more important in day-to-day judging,
can the majority of a court force those judges who don't agree with Sunstein's judicial canons to use them? Right now a laissez faire attitude
toward the use of judicial canons seems to prevail.
Given the infinite permutations and combinations of the canons that
courts might apply in any one case, it is at least questionable whether the
infusion of canons would make judicial outcomes any more predictable
or less "indeterminate" than they are now. For example, suppose an
agency seeks by regulation to limit the timing or traditional scope of a
"hearing" required by the statute. This type of dispute often divides our
court. One side argues plain meaning of the statute; the other says the
statute is ambiguous and therefore requires deference to the agency. This
single dispute could conceivably and simultaneously invoke canons on
changed circumstances, principles focusing on the systemic effects of regulatory controls, broad constructions for noncommodity values, narrow
constructions for interest group transfers, presumptions favoring judicial
review and hearing rights, as well as those against the subversion of statutory purpose by collective action problems. At a minimum, I can count
six potential canons that might apply depending on how one views the
case. Candidly, the consistency of our application of the relatively narrow doctrines we now use in statutory construction is sometimes difficult
81. Some examples of well-established canons include those statutory constructions that favor
the avoidance of constitutional issues, favor the harmonization of different parts of the same statute,
make presumptions against implied repeals, announce the need for a clear statement to preempt state
law, and favor Indian tribes.
82. See C. SUNSTEIN, supra note 47, at 186-89, 238.
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to rationalize successfully. Thus, I worry that more canons or principles
will make our decisions less coherent.8 3
The administrative issues that courts review are usually quite discrete. Examples of administrative issues in recent D.C. Circuit cases include: whether Congress intended to grant the Secretary of
Transportation absolute discretion in regulating the price for the sale of
repossessed vessels under Title XI of the Merchant Marine Act;8 4
whether the EPA's regulation allowing states to enforce state drinking
water standards is prohibited by the Safe Drinking Water Act;8 5 whether
the Department of Labor's new methodology for computing the minimum wage for alien temporary agricultural workers is authorized by the
Immigration Reform and Control Act;8 6 and which agency-FERC or
the ICC-has jurisdiction to regulate rates charged for the transport of
87
anhydrous ammonia by pipelines.
Unlike administrators or legislators, judges cannot always see how
their little piece of the regulatory puzzle fits into the big picture. Judges
know agency policies interface with, reinforce, or undermine one another. But courts are generally not privy to all the facts that permit a
coherent overall regulatory assessment about under- or over-regulation.
In appropriate cases, courts might require agencies to touch on some of
Sunstein's ideas as part of their task of adequately explaining their rationale, but that is the most I see courts doing with Sunstein's principles
in the near future. Even if courts were willing to take this step, however,
it would be only a modest increment to an existing practice, and not the
dramatic transformation of review that Sunstein may seek.
D.

Where Is Congress in All This?

Sunstein tells us that his plea for more attention to the substance of
administrative law is directed primarily to legislators and administrators
rather than to the courts.8 8 Elsewhere, however, Sunstein asserts that the
courts have an important role in responding to regulatory malfunction
because legislative reform must overcome an enormous "burden of inertia,"' 89 while interstitial regulatory reform can be brought about "most
easily" through executive and judicial interpretation. 90
83. Minimally, I need more detailed and persuasive case studies showing how a number of the
proposed canons would help.
84. See Liberty Maritime Corp. v. United States, 928 F.2d 413 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
85. See National Wildlife Fed'n v. EPA, 925 F.2d 470 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
86. See AFL-CIO v. Dole, 923 F.2d 182 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
87. See C.F. Indus. v. FERC, 925 F.2d 476 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
88. See Sunstein, supra note 62, at 642.
89. Id. at 632.
90. C. SUNSTmIN,supra note 47, at I11.
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But-as Sunstein is aware-the understandable frustration with divided government and the cumbersome nature of congressional reform
cannot satisfactorily answer the question of why general principles of
statutory interpretation--especially value-laden ones-should not come
from Congress rather than the courts. Why, for instance, ought courts to
assume Congress meant to allow de minimis exceptions in all statutes
where it does not expressly deny them, or that Congress intended to endorse cost-benefit balancing if it does not say otherwise? A vastly superior outcome, and one that Sunstein does not contest, would be for
Congress to provide checklists in all its statutes covering issues like de
minimis exemptions and cost-benefit balancing. Better still, Congress
could pass its own general canons of construction or put a particularized
interpretive section in each regulatory statute. In a few instances Congress has done just that. In the Freedom of Information Act, for example, Congress announced that the listed exceptions to disclosure were
exclusive, and also that courts had de novo review authority. 91 The Federal Courts Study Committee's recent report suggests a legislative checklist for every bill, including provisions on preemption, retroactivity, the
forum for judicial review, statute of limitations, standing, private rights
of action, and the definition of "key terms."' 92 Such a checklist might
also include other indications of how and by whom Congress wants the
law to be construed. Most reformers-happily not Sunstein-assume
that Congress is incapable of addressing these issues when drafting new
statutes. The fact remains, however, that Congress is the primary
lawmaker and the most logical source of general principles of statutory
construction.
The trouble with judicially created canons is that judges make them
up and then tell Congress to legislate with them in mind. This approach
is topsy-turvy. More logically, Congress should announce its own interpretive principles and judges should merely apply them.
E.

What Is the Court's Real Function on Review?

Yet another fundamental question pervades Sunstein's work: What
is the objective of statutory construction? Most judges I know still adhere to the simplistic notion that the court's mission is fidelity to congres91. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B), (d)(1988).
92. FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITrEE, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES,

REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY CoMMrrFEE 91 (1990); see also id. at 92-93 (additional
views of Congressman Kastenmeier, Judge Keep, President Lee, Congressman Morehouse, and
Judge Posner that Congress needs an office to (1) assist committees to assess the impact of legislation
on the judiciary, (2) call Congress's attention to important court decisions, and (3) facilitate communication between the branches).
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sional intent, fictional or not. According to Sunstein, however, the goal
of a construing judge should be to direct the interpretation of the law in
ways that are regulatorily sound and enhance good national policy
(where she can do so without flouting a clear congressional intent). 93
This sounds a bit like a "natural law" or a substantive due process approach to regulation.
However, experience has taught this judge that once courts leave the
moorings of the statute-its text, history, and enunciated purposes-and
move into the sphere of good and bad regulatory policy, the bounds of
their authority and discretion become decidedly murky. For instance,
consider the proportionality canon that says the aggregate social benefits
should equal the aggregate social costs of a particular regulatory application. Sunstein says the principle "becomes workable on the assumption
that in some cases it will be clear, by reference to a widely held social
consensus, that social benefits are small in comparison to social costs." '94
He continues: "In such cases the proportionality principle can be administered by reference to widespread intuitions, and statutes should be construed so as not to permit or require the action at issue." 95 That idea is a
bit scary to me. It is reminiscent of parallel mandates in other parts of
our law, such as deciding whether something "shocks the conscience of a
civilized people" or identifying community-based standards for obscenity. Somehow, however, intuitions about the effects of a regulation seem
even less judicially accessible. This may seem like a cheap shot, but how
can we be sure that the "widespread intuitions" are not the judges' own
or those of her ADA or Federalist friends?
Let me offer another, more pragmatic plea for relatively simple and
certain frameworks for reviewing courts: Judges of radically different
political and social viewpoints can only reason together on the basis of a
few relatively simple propositions that they can all agree govern, so that
disputes can be narrowly focused on their application. The Chevron decision, 9 6 warts and all, has accomplished this. Chevron says that unless
Congress has addressed the issue, the agency's interpretation of a statute
wins in all but the most extreme cases. 97 On the D.C. Circuit, we vigorously debate what the issue is in a particular case, whether Congress has
93. See C. SUNSTEIN, supra note 47, at 111-59 (discussing the problems judges confront when
interpreting statutes and several ways of addressing them consistent with sound public policy). But
see Moglen & Pierce, Sunstein's New Canons: Choosing the Fictionsof Statutory Interpretation,57 U.
CHI. L. REv. 1203, 1245 (1990) (rejecting Sunstein's canons as "interpretive fictions" that cannot
provide consistent guidance to 800 individual federal judges).
94. C. SUNSTEIN, supra note 47, at 182.
95. Id.
96. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
97. Id. at 843-44.
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addressed the issue, whether Congress meant to delegate interpretation
to the agency or to the courts, and how reasonable the agency's interpre-

tation of a particular statute is. But these debates are conducted within a
narrow consensual framework. Were we to switch to a broader frame-

work of what is good regulatory policy or which of thirty canons apply,
our debates would be less focused, our work would be more complex,
and our differences would more frequently prove irreconcilable. A simple decisional framework may be essential to collegial decisionmaking in
a court of widely differing views. Sunstein says his principles would
"convert hard cases into easy ones," 98 but precisely the opposite could be
true.
Heaven knows we have enough to dispute in applying so simple a
directive as Chevron. In a recent case, one panel, over a spirited dissent,
remanded a case to the Food & Drug Administration based upon a statutory ambiguity the court itself found in the use of the word "the" instead
of "an" to modify the phrase "active ingredient." 99 This ambiguity was
not previously identified by the agency or the petitioner. You see, we do
not want for grist at our mill. Can you imagine what we would do with

an arsenal of canons?o
98. C.

SUNSTEIN,

°

supra note 47, at 192.

99. See Abbott Laboratories v. Young, 920 F.2d 984, 985-88 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
100. The ability of Sunstein's canons to coexist with Chevron is a subject all to itself. In a recent
article Sunstein recognizes Chevron's primacy in current administrative law: "In its allocation of
governmental authority and in its production of outcomes in the real world, the importance of the
case far exceeds that of the Supreme Court's more celebrated constitutional rulings on the subject of
separation of powers in the 1980s .... " Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90
COLUM. L. REv. 2071, 2075 (1990). Chevron has been judicially cited more than 1,000 times since
its inception, id. at 2074-75, although Sunstein believes (and I agree) that the lower courts have
grasped onto its two-step analysis too tightly. See id at 2075-76.
In his article, Sunstein tackles the problem of how his canons would fit with the Chevron
mother lode. They could play an important role in the first step of Chevron's analysis, the determination of whether Congress has spoken to the issue or left it ambiguous: "[A]n agency should be
permitted to depart from the literal meaning of the statute in cases involving issues that Congress has
not specifically considered, especially when such departures plausibly make sense of the statute in
light of Congress's general purposes." Id. at 2118.
Sunstein would also have courts decide if Congress intended agencies or the courts to be the
prime interpreters on the basis of an "assessment of which strategy is the most sensible one to attribute to Congress under the circumstances." Id. at 2086. "This assessment," he cautions, "is not a
mechanical exercise of uncovering an actual legislative decision. It calls for a frankly value-laden
judgment about comparative competence, undertaken in light of the regulatory structure and applicable constitutional considerations." Id. "By itself, an ambiguity is not a delegation of law-interpreting power, and it would be a major error to treat all ambiguities, as delegations." Id. at 2090. To
say the least, this dilution of the current Chevron presumption favoring agency delegation in all
ambiguous cases would effect a major transfer of interpretive power to the courts and away from the
agency.
The canons would presumably come into play to an even greater extent, however, in Chevron's
second step (in which the court ascertains whether the agency's action is based on a permissible
construction of the statute), where agency deference is currently at its zenith. More and more,
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Conclusion

It is easy to criticize and fault new ideas. Usually, however, even
radical new concepts, emanating from the responsibly adventurous, contain salvage-worthy points. That is certainly true of Sunstein's Article.
Many judges have been restive under the rigid approach to judicial review dictated by Chevron. Sunstein forces us to think about whether we
would prefer a quite different approach, resembling a kind of regulatory
substantive due process. When Sunstein says that "[i]nterpreters should
be authorized to depart from the original meaning [of a statute] and to
press the usual meaning of words in particular directions if the context
suggests that this strategy would lead to superior outcomes," that "the
test for superior outcomes will necessarily call into play controversial
judgments of value and policy," and that "[t]he reservation of judicial
authority to push ambiguous statutes in particular directions seems more
rather than less likely to yield a coherent, rational, and just system of
law," 10 1 he is throwing out a challenge to the way most judges currently
perceive and perform their interpretive functions. Even if I am too timid
or groove-worn to immediately grab on to that challenge, I believe his
detailed analysis and proposal merit close and continued study. I hope
my critique will aid, rather than hinder, that process.
courts are finding ambiguities that give the nod to the agency rather than finding a controlling
congressional intent. In this area, Sunstein's regulatory canons would compete with the deferential
push of Chevron, perhaps returning courts to something akin to the pre-Chevron era when we freely
interpreted statutes. Because of the greater role judicial canons would play in Sunstein's world,
Sunstein has not only prioritized the canons but also rated them in relation to the Chevron deference
to agencies. Thus, Sunstein would have the following canons trump agency deference: norms of
syntax; interpretive norms such as clear intent or the presumption against retroactivity; constitutionally inspired norms, including the preference for interpreting statutes so that they are constitutional;
norms designed to counter agency bias against vulnerable groups; and, probably most important,
regulatory presumptions against allowing agencies to decide their own jurisdiction. Id. at 2100. On
the other hand, norms against repeal by implication, exceptions to the antitrust laws, and substantive
amendments in appropriation statutes, trump Chevron's agency deference under Chevron's first step
only if they help ascertain congressional intent. However, under Chevron's second step these canons
could not come into play if they were merely aids to the reasonableness of the agency interpretation.
This last formula introduces a third layer for courts to juggle-some canons would beat Chevron
only some of the time. Interestingly, most of Sunstein's regulatory canons, including the ones favoring de minimis exceptions and cost-benefit proportionality, give way to Chevron agency deference.
Id. at 2105-19.
It is not easy to predict in this complex calculus who gains in power by mixing Chevron with the
canons: Congress, the executive, or the courts. Initially, under Chevron's first step, courts can look
to more sources for legislative intent. In the second step, courts can weigh the canons against deference, yet courts will also find themselves deferring to agencies even when their actions contradict the
literal terms of the statute. Courts would definitely gain overall power and flexibility, and the reign
of Chevron would be drastically weakened. On balance, I think the legislature comes out worst, for
Sunstein's program would subject its laws to the mercy of the executive and the courts more than
ever before.
101. C. SUNSTEIN, supra note 47, at 135-36.

